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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OREM CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

;

vs.

]
])

EDWARD JOSEPH GALLAGHER,

;

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20040375

)

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE APPELLEE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT A
SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The Appellee "generally agrees" with the Statement of Facts compiled by Appellant,
with several exceptions (Appellee's Brief at 2). Because a fair recitation of the facts recited
in the proffer to the trial court is determinative of the propriety of the trial court's ruling in
this matter, Appellant recites the facts, incorporating a response to the "additions and/or
exceptions" raised by Appellee (Appellee's Brief at 2-3).
1.

On November 27,2002, Mr. Medina, an electrician, employed by Utah Valley

State College, was driving his vehicle and was following a car that was on Geneva Road in
the vicinity of 1200 South in Orem, Utah (R. 166, lines 17-21; R. 164, line 18toR. 163, line
6).
2.

As Mr. Medina was traveling, the vehicle he was following turned South on
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Sandhill road and Mr. Medina continued to follow him. Mr. Medina, who had been to the
police academy, noticed that the vehicle in front of him was evidencing a driving pattern.
Specifically, Mr. Medina noticed that the vehicle touched the opposite travel lanes three
times (R.166 line 21 to R. 165, line 1).
3.

The driving pattern observed by Mr. Medina led him to believe that the driver

might be under the influence of alcohol, was tired or diabetic. Accordingly, Mr. Medina
continued to follow the vehicle. Mr. Medina noted that the vehicle continued up Sandhill
Road in Orem, Utah County, Utah, and finally pulled in front of a residence (R. 165, lines
1 to 5).
4.

Mr. Medina noted that the vehicle was a souped up Mustang 5.0. When Mr.

Medina caught up to the vehicle at the residence, the person driving it was already out of the
vehicle. The person appeared to be wearing shorts, was tall and went into the residence (R.
165, lines 6 to 10).
5.

Mr. Medina called in a report to the police. The make of the vehicle and the

license plate he called in was a Mustang with Utah license plate 858XYL. In addition, Mr.
Medina reported his position as 2000 North Geneva Road, instead of 2000 North Sandhill
Road, where he was actually located (R. 165, lines 13 to 22). Mr. Medina did not report
to dispatch the color of the Mustang, only the fact that it was a Ford Mustang (R. 163
to 166).
6.

Officer Warenski, who was the arresting officer, had his testimony proffered

also. Orem City dispatch had sent out a call on a green Ford Mustang. Dispatch did not list
a plate number and did not list any particular part of Orem where the vehicle was seen. The

proffer was clarified to indicate that the vehicle could "possibly" be eastbound on
University Parkway (R. 162, lines 14 to 17). As the officer was driving Eastbound on
1200 or 1300 South University Parkway, at approximately 12:46a.m. (a little after midnight),
on November 28, 2002, the officer noticed a green Mustang that was parked in an area
"quite a ways out," in the north parking lot of the Outback Steakhouse (R. 163, line 17 to
R. 162, line 3; R. 161, lines 4 to 10). The plate number on the Defendant's vehicle was
entirely dissimilar to that given by Mr. Medina to Dispatch; it was 795LZN (R. 161, lines
14 to 24).
7.

Officer Warenski pulled behind the Defendant's vehicle, blocking it so that

it could not back out. The Defendant could however, have pulled forward (R. 162, line 23
to page 161, line 13). The officer turned his spotlight, illuminating the rear of the
Defendant's vehicle, got out of the police vehicle, and walked up to the driver's side
window of the Defendant's vehicle, where the Defendant, Mr. Gallagher, was seated. When
the officer approached the side window, Mr. Gallagher rolled his window down. The officer
smelled the odor of alcohol and asked the Defendant to get out of the vehicle to do field
sobriety tests (R. 162, lines 5 to 11).
Appellee, by its failure to respond, does not contest that the remainder of the trial
court's findings of fact, not explicitly detailed above, are clearly erroneous and not
supported by the Record in this case.
In addition to the significant alteration that the Appellee's admission makes to the
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factual basis upon which the trial court ruled, the inconsistencies in the Record become more
glaring. For instance, there is no reconciliation between the fact that the apparent last time
that Mr. Medina saw the Mustang and its driver, the Mustang had pulled into a private
residence and the driver had emerged and was entering the residence (R. 165, lines 6 to 10).
The sequence of events leading Orem dispatch to the conclusion that the Mustang was on
the move eastbound on University Parkway is not explained (R. 162, lines 14 to 17).
The Record is silent regarding how Orem dispatch added the color "green" to the
description of the Mustang or how the erroneous plate number was added to the dispatch
message. After a careful examination, the Record left for review by this Court, as it rules
on the ultimate finding of the trial court on the Appellant's motion to suppress, is disjointed,
fragmented and inconsistent.
POINT II:
THE APPELLEE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE
OFFICER DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE
SUSPICION BEFORE INITIATING THE ENCOUNTER
WITH THE DEFENDANT.
Before an officer can legally make a level II encounter, the officer must "point to
specific, articulable facts, which together with reasonable inference drawn from the facts,
would lead a reasonable person to conclude [the defendant] had committed or was about to
commit a crime." State v. Struhs, 940 P. 2d 1225,1228 (1197) (quoting State v. Truiillo. 739
P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct App. 1987)).
Appellee acknowledges that the facts, as conceded above, do not constitute a basis
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upon which the trial court could have fouttd that Officer Warenski had a reasonable
suspicion that the Defendant/Appellant had or was about to commit a crime. Accordingly,
the Appellee acknowledges that if this Court finds that the confrontation between the officer
and the Defendant was a level II stop, it was an illegal seizure because it was done without
the officer having a reasonable suspicion.
Thus, the only issue remaining is whether the actions of the officer constituted a
seizure, a level II encounter, of the Defendant. If the Defendant was seized by a law
enforcement o fficer, w ithout r easonable s uspicion, the trial c ourt e rred i n d enying t he
Defendant's motion to suppress.
POINT III:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
FINDING THAT THE SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT
CONSTITUTED A LEVEL I STOP.
The Appellant's contention is that the trial court erred in initially determining that the
actions of the officer constituted a Level I, as opposed to a Level II encounter with the
Defendant.

The Appellant respectfully submits that the initial actions of the Orem City

police officer, in positioning his vehicle behind the Defendant, activating his take-down
lights and approaching the Defendant, constituted a seizure under the relevant provisions
of both the United States and Utah Constitutions and the case law interpreting those
provisions.
It is submitted that one cannot extract the motivation of the officer from the formula
used to determine if a seizure had occurred. With all the ambiguity in the Record, there is
5

one fact that is clear. Officer Warenski was responding to the dispatch from the Orem Police
Department when he encountered the Defendant.

When the officer recognized the

Defendant's green Ford Mustang, he concluded that it was consistent with the vehicle
described in the dispatch and diverted from his patrol and street search, to enter the mall
parking lot and stop his vehicle directly behind the Defendant's vehicle.
Despite the fact that the mall parking lot was lit and adjacent to a major thoroughfare
(University Parkway), the office activated his take down lights to point into the rear window
of the Defendant's car. The officer then got out of his vehicle and approached the
Defendant's driver's side window. As he approached, the Defendant submitted to the
authority, did not move the vehicle and rolled his window down. It must be recognized that
aside from the totally unsubstantiated reason for the use of the lights urged by Appellee of
officer safety; the result of the illumination in the back windows of an automobile, even at
dusk, is to hamper the driver's ability to track the movements of the officer. With the driver
blinded, the officer can approach from either side of the vehicle in stealth, essentially
"freezing" the driver.
In deciding the issue of whether a defendant is seized under any set of
circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per
curiam), acknowledged three levels of police encounters with the public that are
constitutionally permissible: (1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a
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person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.
Id. at 617-18 (quoting United States v. Merritt 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984)).
A first level stop, as described in Deitman, is a voluntary encounter where a citizen
may respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time. However, a seizure
under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall. 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980). In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court cited circumstances that could
indicate a seizure: (1) the threatening presence of several officers; (2) the display of a
weapon by an officer; (3) some physical touching of the person of the citizen; or (4) the use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled. Id. at 554. However, as developed below, there are other measures that an
officer can take that exerts the same show of authority noted in Mendenhall
A.

Blocking a Vehicle, as Described in the Facts of this Case,
Constituted a Seizure, a Level II Encounter.

It is important to recognize that the Appellee does not dispute the Appellant's
contention that the blocking of the Defendant's vehicle as described in the Statement of
Facts, constituted a seizure under Utah law. Aside from simply reciting that the officer's
vehicle was parked behind the Defendant, thus not obstructing forward movement, the
7

Appellee does not dispute the significance of the officer's actions (Appellee's Brief at 6).
In State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765 (Utah App.,1990), the Utah Court of Appeals
discussed the issue of whether the blocking of a suspect's vehicle constitutes a seizure. The
Court reviewed its earlier decision in State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct.App.1989),
where the court found that a seizure occurred when an officer "blocked the defendant's car,
got out of his marked police car to talk to defendant late at night, asked for defendant's
license and registration, issued defendant a traffic citation and required defendant to remain
while he did a warrants check and called a backup officer." Id. ait 882.
In Smithy this court noted that other jurisdictions have held that "when
an officer blocks a defendant's vehicle, a seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment has occurred even though the original stop was
not initiated by the officer." Id. at 882 n. 3. See People v. Guy, 121
Mich.App. 592, 329 N.W.2d 435, 440 (1982) (although the initial stop of
defendant's vehicle in a driveway was not the result of the officer's actions, his
partial blockage of the driveway and subsequent visit to defendant's car clearly
constituted a detention of the automobile and would be the equivalent of a
police-initiated "stop"); United States v. Kerr, 817 F .2d 1 384,1 386 (9th
Cir. 1987) (seizure occurred because it was not possible for defendant to drive
around the officer's car and defendant stopped and exited his car primarily in
response to the police officer's official appearance and conduct rather than of
his own volition). (Emphasis added).
Id. at 767-68.
The court in State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765 (Utah App.,1990), then differentiated the
facts in Jackson by stating that the cases, holding that a police officer's blocking of another's
vehicle constituted a seizure, were distinguishable. In Jackson, the blocking did not occur
until after defendant had exited his car of his own volition. Further, it was defendant's
8

voluntary act that initiated the contact with officer, rather than the officer's conduct that
created the confrontation. IcL at 768. Certainly, the facts of this case are consistent with the
cases cited in Jackson, supra, in that the officer blocked the vehicle while the Defendant was
inside the car and the officer initiated the contact with the Defendant.
In State v. Gronau, 31 P.3d 601 (Utah App.,2001), the court discussed the issue
again:
"A seizure under the [FJourth [A]mendment occurs when a reasonable
person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free
to leave." State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct.App.1990).
However, under the Fourth Amendment, property, as opposed to a seizure
of a person, is seized when there is some meaningful interference with the
individual's possessory interests in that property. See State v. Northrup, 756
P.2d 1288, 1293 (Utah CtApp.1988).
In discussing the doctrine's application to the facts in Gronau, supra, the court
stated:
We believe that Jackson is applicable and that the court's analysis logically
extends to the facts of the present matter. Given the lack of Utah case law
available to guide this court under this rather peculiar factual scenario, the
conclusions reached by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits regarding the seizure
of tangible personal property are persuasive, particularly in light of our
discussion in Jackson. In the present matter, Gronau, like the defendant in
Jackson who drove to the bar, went to the restaurant not because
Mangelson was following him, "but rather because he chose to go there."
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768. Further, Gronau had already exited his
vehicle when Mangelson pulled up behind him, and after exiting the
vehicle, Gronau was "free to walk to the [restaurant] or wherever he
chose,11 id., as was evident when he ended the conversation with
Mangelson and went inside to have breakfast. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 605.
9

For the same reasons, the Appellant's case falls under the rule that blocking a vehicle
constitutes a seizure. The Defendant took no action to leave the car and initiate the
confrontation with the officer. It was the officer, who, by blocking the Defendant's vehicle,
exiting his car and illuminating his lights, made it clear that the Defendant was not free to
leave. Certainly, there was a meaningful interference with the Defendant's possessory
interests in his vehicle as required by the case law.
The Defendant relies on State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) and
State v. Justesen, 47 P.3d 936 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), which were thoroughly discussed in the
Appellant's original brief. Again, under the facts of those cases and the principles enunciated
therein, the actions of the officer herein of blocking the Defendant's vehicle, illuminating the
Defendant's interior and approaching the vehicle, evidenced the obvious, that the Defendant
was not free to leave. As stressed originally, given the dispatch from Orem City, if the
Defendant would have attempted to pull away, the officer would have taken the steps
necessary to stop the Defendant's vehicle. In this case, the officer did not approach the
Defendant's vehicle while on regular patrol with an honest belief that the vehicle may have
been stalled, abandoned or that the occupants might be in trouble. Id. at 939. The officer did
not approach the vehicle in a courteous way, and certainly, there was not one iota of evidence
that the officer needed take-down lights to illuminate the rear of the Defendant's vehicle or
the mall parking lot for his safety.
In addition, Appellant points the court to State v. Sanger, 420 N.W.2d 241, 242
10

(Minn. App. 1988), in which a police officer stopped his squad car in a manner that prevented
a car parked on a residential street from leaving. IcL The officer did not testify about his intent
or explain why he positioned his squad car to block Sanger's exit. IcL at 243. Sanger looked
over, saw the officer, started his car and backed up less than two feet, whereupon the officer
beeped his horn and flashed his lights, and Sanger stopped the car. IdL at 242. The Sanger
court found that boxing in Sanger's car, activating the lights, and honking the horn created
a strong show of authority that resulted in a seizure. Sanger, 420 N.W.2d at 243. See also,
State v. Inabnitt 76 Ohio App.3d 586, 589-590 (1991) (holding that a seizure occurred
when an officer used his vehicle to "block in" the defendant's vehicle in a parking lot).
In this case, the combination of parking behind the Defendant in a corner of a mall
parking lot, coupled with the illumination of the interior of the car, blinding of the Defendant
and the officer's action in leaving his vehicle are the equivalent of the blocking, activation of
the lights and honking in Sanger.
Appellant submits that it is the blocking of the vehicle, the use of take down lights (as
opposed to mild illumination, such as a flashlight, and the officer's action in exiting his
vehicle that would make it clear to any reasonable person, that he was riot free to leave and
thus seized, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
9.2(h), at 416-17 (2d ed. 1987). United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct
1870,1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). One of the central purposes of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is to "safeguard the privacy
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and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of government officials." Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Stated another way to 'prevent arbitrary and
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of
individuals.'United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
Appellant submits that an officer may display his power and thereby seize a motorist
using a number of different methods that include blocking the defendants vehicle from
leaving. See State v. Epperson, 703 P.2d 761 (Kan. 1985) (holding that where an officer
parked his vehicle so as to block the defendant's car, such an action constituted a "stop");
People v. Guv. 329 N.W.2d 435 (Mich.Ct.App., 1982) (stressing that while the officer had
not initially stopped the car, a seizure arose when the officer blocked the lane of travel with
his open car d oor s o the defendant c ould n ot 1 eave). T he m ethods include the u se o f
emergency and other lights. See Statev.Walp, 672 P.2d 372 (Or.Ct.App., 1983) (holding that
a seizure occurred when the officer flashed his emergency lights behind the stopped car);
State v. Stround... 634 P.2d 316 (Wash.Ct.App 1981) (questioning of the occupants of a
parked car constituted a seizure since the officers sought to summon the occupants with their
emergency lights and their high beam headlights). Also, the surrounding of the vehicle by
several officers conveys the message to a motorist that he or she is restrained. See United
States v. Pena-Cantu. 639 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that when the officers
surrounded a parked vehicle on both sides and questioned the driver, a seizure occurred).
What all the methods have in common is a clear impression, readily ascertainable by
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a reasonable person, by what they have observed in the manner in which law enforcement
officers operate on the roadways, that he is restrained. The court in State v. Thomason, Cr. A.
Nos. IN92-07-0022 through 0025, Goldstein, J. (Mar. 14, 1994) (MEM.OP. & ORDER),
affd, No. 113, 1994, Berger, J. (Sept. 28, 1994) (ORDER), held that the officers illegally
seized the defendant, who was sitting in a parked car, by using the emergency lights and
blocking in the vehicle since the officers did not have reasonable articulable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot. See, United States v. Zukas.843 F.2d 179 (C.A. 5,1988) (The use
of a police car to block the path of another vehicle is recognized as such a seizure)
In this case, the Defendant saw the exertion of authority and submitted to it by not
moving and rolling the window down on his vehicle. Defendant submits that the facts of this
case clearly demonstrate a seizure, a level II stop.
B.

Illumination o f t he D efendant's V ehicle i s O nly O ne F actor t o
Consider in Determining Whether the Defendant was Seized.

Appellee expends most of its argument trying to support the proposition that
illumination of a suspect's vehicle alone is not sufficient to constitute a seizure. As
demonstrated repeatedly above, it is the Appellant's contention that it is the combination of
the motivation of the officer, his action of parking behind the Defendant in a vacant mall
parking lot, the activation of blinding take down lights, the officer's action in leaving his
vehicle and approaching the Defendant's vehicle and the Defendant's submission thereto,
that constitutes a level II encounter.
Accordingly, the cases cited by the Appellee that hold that only one of the actions
13

taken in this case, illumination, does not amount to a seizure, do not controvert the argument
of the Appellant.

The Appellee cites a 1927 United States Supreme Court case for the

proposition that a searchlight does not constitute a search (Appellee's Brief at 7). The issue
in United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) was whether the use of search lights by the
Coast Guard at sea during Prohibition constituted a search. The issue in this case relates to
the use of illumination together with blocking and approaching a vehicle as it relates to a
"seizure."
The Appellee cites State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981), cert denied 454 U.S. 1057
(1981) (Appellee's Brief at 7). Again, the case is inapposite. InLee, the principal issue was
whether an officer who, with the aid of a flashlight, looked into the windows of the campertruck and saw stolen items conducted an illegal "search" within the constitutional meaning
of the term. The case had nothing to do with the "seizure" of a suspect. The case related to
the doctrine of "plain view." Id at 51. The court held that for an officer to look at what is
in open view from a position lawfully accessible to the public cannot constitute an invasion
of a reasonable expectancy of privacy. The court held that in that case that it made no
difference that there was no probable cause to make an arrest upon the officer's initial visit
to defendant's residence. The court stated that "[t]he open pathway to the front door was an
implied invitation to members of the public to enter thereon. Even though the officer
harbored a suspicion that criminal activity had occurred, that did not render unlawful his
looking, without a warrant, at that which was in clear sight" IcL The court continued, that".
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. the use of a flashlight to assist the natural vision at night does not make an "observation"
a "search." Id. Again, the case has nothing to do with the issues presented in this matter.
Appellant is not arguing that the use of a searchlight at sea or a flashlight at night, by an
officer, is a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. The issue is whether the use of take
down lights coupled with the other factors in this case, including the blocking of the
Defendant's vehicle and the officer's exit from his vehicle constituted a level II seizure.
Appellant submits that the narrative of the Appellee relating to the need for
illumination for officer safety is completely irrelevant to the facts of this case and law related
thereto is not grounded in the record. As pointed out throughout the briefing in this case,
there is absolutely no evidence that the take down lights, in addition to the officer's
headlights, the lights from the parking lot and surrounding businesses were necessary for any
officer safety considerations. (See Appellee's Brief at 7-9).
The Appellee cited several cases that are represented to refute the Appellant's position
that the actions taken by the officer in this case constituted a seizure of the Defendant
(Appellee's Brief at 9-10). H owever, a closer look at the authority demonstrates their
consistency with the position taken by the Appellant or their irrelevance to this case.
In U.S. v. Peoples, 925 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir.) cert denied, 502 U.S. 938 (1991), police
responded to an anonymous telephone call reporting suspicious persons in dark clothing near
a light-colored van in an apartment complex. Two officers approached the parking area of
the apartment complex in separate vehicles and from different directions, with their head
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lights out. One of the officers observed two men, James Peoples and Marcus Skinner, dressed
in dark clothing, walking side-by-side down a walkway toward the parking area. Peoples was
carrying a brown paper bag. After following them, the officer exited his vehicle, drew his
gun, and approached Peoples and Skinner. Shining his flashlight on the pair, Benning
identified himself as a police officer. Peoples and Skinner both turned away from Benning;
Peoples took a few steps toward Officer Johnston, who had not yet made his presence known,
and Skinner began walking toward a light-colored van parked in the parking area. As Skinner
turned, he tucked the bag behind his leg out of view from Officer Benning. Officer Johnston,
standing next to his vehicle, shined the vehicle's spotlight on the entire area and Skinner
immediately began "an extremely hurried walk" toward the van. Both officers then ordered
Peoples and Skinner to stop. Despite two additional commands to stop by Officer Benning,
Skinner continued to approach the van at a hurried pace. When Skinner refused to stop after
the commands, Officer Johnston also drew his weapon. Upon reaching the van, Skinner
reached inside the open driver's door window and dropped the bag inside the van. Skinner
then responded to the officers' commands. Officer Benning observed a person sitting in the
front passenger seat, Marshall Bradley, make a reaching movement toward the rear of the
van. Through the side window of the van, Benning observed am additional person, Lovyed
Gregory, moving about in the rear of the van. Bradley and Gregory exited the van upon
Officer Benning's order, leaving the front passenger door and the side door open. With the
aid ofhis flashlight, Benning looked through the open doors and opened a rear door to ensure
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that there were no additional occupants in the van. Bradley, Gregory, Peoples and Skinner
were then placed against the van in a wall search position and patted down for weapons. No
weapons were found and Officer Benning subsequently asked Skinner and Bradley where the
bag was located. Skinner and Bradley both denied having any knowledge of a bag. Bradley,
Gregory, Peoples and Skinner were ordered to kneel down cross-legged with their hands
behind their heads while Officer Johnston searched the van for the bag. Johnston found the
bag on the floor of the van behind the rear bench seat in an upright position with the top of
the bag partially open. Using his flashlight, Johnston looked inside the bag and saw a white
substance encased in plastic. Laboratory tests later confirmed that the white powder found
in the sack was cocaine. IdL at 1083-84.
On appeal, the defendant contended that all evidence presented at trial was
inadmissible because it was the result of an invalid stop. Defendant asserted that officers did
not have sufficient facts prior to the seizure to provide the officers with reasonable suspicion
that Peoples was engaged in criminal activity. IcL
In determining first, when the defendant was seized, the court stated:
We conclude that the seizure of Peoples and the other suspects occurred
when the officers ordered Peoples and Skinner to stop. At this moment,
there was a clear order for the suspects to submit to the officers. The order
was given after Officer Johnston shined his spotlight on the entire area, and
both officers began asserting the order from different directions. These
actions by the officers amount to a show of authority such that a reasonable
person would have believed he 1086 or she was not free to leave.
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Id. at 1085-86.
In discussing the process used to decide when the seizure occurred and the
information held by the officers at the time the defendant was seized, the court stated:
It is arguable that the seizure occurred when Officer Benning exited his
vehicle, drew his weapon and identified himself as a police officer.
Although the display of a weapon is indicative of a seizure, Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 554,100 S.Ct. at 1877, we decline to find a seizure at this point
because there is nothing in the record to indicate that a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave after Officer Benning
approached the suspects with his drawn weapon. The officer did not order
the suspects to stop and, considering the darkness of night and Officer
Benningfs act of shining his flashlight toward the suspects, the suspects may
not have seen the officer's drawn weapon.
It is similarly arguable that the seizure occurred later, after Skinner dropped
the bag into the van, stopped walking and obeyed the officers1 commands
to stop. The suspects were freely moving about up) to this point. However,
under Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554,100 S.Ct. at 1877, the test to determine
when a seizure occurs is objective rather than subjective. On the facts of
this case, we conclude that a reasonable person would believe that he or she
was not free to leave when the officers ordered Peoples and Skinner to
stop....
Id at 1086.
As applied to the facts of this case, the court determined the moment of seizure
as the time when the defendant knew that the officer's actions were centered on him
and that his show of authority was clearly visible to the Defendant. In this case, those
exact principles are the basis for the conclusion that the officer seized the Defendant
in this case, when he parked behind the Defendant's vehicle that was alone in a
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corner of a mall parking lot and then illuminated the entire interior of the Defendant's
vehicle with the officer's search lights that are on the panel over the car, used to
hamper a driver's ability to see the movement of an officer. The officer's actions in
exiting his vehicle and approaching the Defendant's vehicle and the Defendant's
submission thereto, constitute the elements of a seizure.
Appellee cites State v. Hunter, 783 S.W. 2d 493 (Mo. App. 1990) (Appellee's
Brief at 9). In that case, the officer was on patrol looking for a subject who was
reportedly threatening suicide and possibly had a weapon. While in the area he came
upon a vehicle parked at the entrance to a private drive. As he approached the vehicle
it appeared to be unoccupied. The officer then drove up and stopped behind the
vehicle to obtain a better view and determine whether the suicide subject might be
in the vehicle. The court found that the officer stopped behind the vehicle as a safety
consideration and at that time he did not know whether it was occupied. The officer
then turned on his "take-down" lights to see if there was anyone present in the car..
At that point, he observed two occupants in what he described as a "flurry of
movement." Initially, both the passenger and the driver had been "slouched down".
However, immediately after the light was shown, the driver lunged toward the
passenger and then returned to an upright p osition. Then the p assenger ducked
completely out of view before returning to an upright position. Officer Mayer was of
the opinion that appellant, the passenger, had placed something under his seat and
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that it was possibly a weapon. After observing this activity within the vehicle, Officer
Mayer out of concern for his safety called for backup and "ran" the license on the
vehicle. kL at 494.
Appellant argued that at the moment the officer pulled up behind the car in which
he was a passenger and turned on his "take-down" lights, that he had been "seized"
unlawfully and that the ensuing search was unreasonable. Id. In resolving the issue, the
court stated:
. . . [W]hen Officer Mayer stopped behind the vehicle in question he was
on patrol looking for a subject who was reportedly threatening suicide and
possibly had a weapon. The car appeared to be out of place and the officer
wanted to determine if it was connected to the suicide subject who was
reportedly in the area. An officer can investigate activity that is consistent
with b oth i nnocent b ehavior and p otential c riminal a ctivity b y a sking
nonintimidating questions. Officer Mayer testified that at the time he
pulled up behind the parked vehicle he didn't know if it was occupied. The
mere fact that Officer Mayer pulled up behind what appeared to be an
unoccupied vehicle did not amount to a seizure of appellant, who was later
determined to be an occupant of the vehicle. Once Officer Mayer turned
on his "take-down" lights to see inside the vehicle, the activity he observed
established a reasonable suspicion on his part that appellant was involved
in criminal activity and caused Officer Mayer to be concerned for his
safety. At this point Officer Mayer was justified in effecting an
investigatory stop.
Id at 495.
In upholding the arrest and search, the court noted that the officer thought the
vehicle appeared out of place and did not appear to be occupied.. The officer then
stopped behind the vehicle and illuminated the take down lights. In the case at bar, the
investigation was not over a distressed citizen, but a DUI investigation. The officer
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knew the Defendant's car matched the description from dispatch and that the vehicle
was occupied. In Hunter, the officer was not intending to block a motorist because he
thought the vehicle was unoccupied. Further, the officer was not trying to blind the
driver or exert his authority for the same reason-he did not know there were people in
the car. In this case, the officer knew the Defendant was in the car, intended to block the
vehicle and intended to use the light as a show of authority as opposed to an
investigation of an out-of-place car to see if it was occupied. Appellant submits that
there is nothing inconsistent with the decision in Hunter and the law cited by Appellant.
Appellee cites State v. Young. 957 P.2d 681 (Wash.,1998) (Appellee's Brief at 9).
The issue in that case, was whether the defendant was "disturbed in his private affairs...
without authority of law" under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution when
the police approached him, walking as a pedestrian, at night in a patrol car while he was
on a public street, shining a spotlight on him. The court held that the shining of the light
on a p edestrian was not a seizure until the defendant recognized the authority and
submitted to it by stopping. Again, the court did not hold that illumination alone was
insufficient to constitute a seizure but that a seizure has to have a component involving
the defendant's submission to that authority. In Hunter, the defendant proceeded after
being illuminated to hide a bag of drugs behind a tree. As soon as he had hidden the bag,
the defendant stopped and the court found he was seized. In this case, the Defendant
acknowledged the officer's actions and submitted to the authority by not moving. Id at
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503-504.
In the other Washington case cited by Appellee, State v. Young, 957 P.2d 681
(Wash. 1998), the initial confrontation did not involve the blocking of a vehicle. In fact,
the car in which the defendant was occupying was fogged over. The officer, again
worried about the occupant, got his attention. In response to the initial questioning, the
defendant admitted to driving on a suspended license and the officer saw drug
paraphernalia in plain view. Again, there are no factors relating to "community
caretaking" in this case or the inability to get ht occupant's attention.
It is submitted that the cases cited by Appellee support, rather than challenge the
Appellant's contention that the confrontation in this case was a level II encounter.
POINT IV:
THE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE SUSPICION OR AN
UNLAWFUL DETENTION MANDATES SUPPRESSION OF THE
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE OFFICERS.
The Appellee does not dispute that a finding of a level II encounter, in the absence
of reasonable suspicion, which the City accepts, requires the suppression of all the
evidence in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant submits that the facts mandate a finding that the trial court erred
in concluding that the seizure of the Defendant constituted a level I as opposed to a level
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II detention, and as a result, all the evidence in this case must be suppressed and the
determination of the trial court denying the Defendant's motion to suppress, reversed.
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